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Psychology has been embroiled in a professional crisis as of late. The research methods commonly
used by psychologists, especially the statistical analyses used to analyze experimental data, are under
scrutiny. The lack of reproducible research findings in psychology and the paucity of published
studies attempting to replicate psychology studies have been widely reported (e.g., Pashler and
Wagenmakers, 2012; Ioannidis et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Although it is
encouraging that people are aware of problems evident in mainstream psychology research and
taking actions to correct them (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015), one problem has received
little or no attention: the reliance on between-subjects research designs. The reliance on group
comparisons is arguably the most fundamental problem at hand because such designs are what
often necessitate the kinds of statistical analyses that have led to psychology’s professional crisis
(Sidman, 1960; Michael, 1974; Parsonson and Baer, 1978). But there is an alternative.
Single-case designs involve the intensive study of individual subjects using repeated measures
of performance, with each subject exposed to the independent variable(s) and each subject serving
as their own control (Sidman, 1960; Barlow et al., 2008; Johnston and Pennypacker, 2009; Kazdin,
2010). Comparisons of performance under baseline and experimental conditions are made for each
subject, with any experimental effects replicated with the individual subject across time or across
multiple subjects in the same experiment. Single-case experiments yield data that can be interpreted
using non-inferential statistics and visual analysis of graphed data, a strategy characteristic of other
natural sciences (Best et al., 2001). Single-case experimental designs are advantageous because they
more readily permit the intensive investigation of each subject and they achieve replication within
an experiment rather than across experiments. Thus, data from just a few subjects tells a story.
THE IMPORTANCE OF REPEATED MEASURES
Psychologists tend to view the population of interest to be people, with the number of individuals
studied taking precedent over the extent to which each individual is studied. Unfortunately,
studying large groups of people makes repeated measurement of any one person difficult. The
consequence is that we often end up knowing very little about very many.
Instead, repeated measures of an individual’s performance should constitute the relevant
“population”—a population of representative individual performance measures. For internal
validity, having representative samples of performances is more important than having a
representative sample of a population. When you have only one or a few measures of each
individual’s performance, it is impossible to know how representative those measures are for the
individual, never mind the population. Consider Figure 1, which depicts hypothetical data from
two subjects. If you sampled the two performances at points A and B, you would conclude that they
were similar. However, if you sampled the performances at points C andD, youwould conclude that
they were quite different. You can see from the complete data set, however, that neither sampling
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FIGURE 1 | Hypothetical data of repeated performance measures for
two subjects.
accurately reflects the performance of either subject. If the data
do not generalize even to the individual, they are unlikely to
generalize to the population as a whole.
THE ACTUAL VS. THE AVERAGE
The degree to which you understand a phenomenon is
proportional to the degree to which you can predict and, where
possible, control its occurrence. This is not simply a matter of
showing that, on average, a certain outcome is more likely under
a certain condition, which is what most of psychology research
shows (Schlinger, 2004). Knowing that the performances of all
subjects in an experiment averaged to a certain value does not
predict the performance of any individual subject, except in a
probabilistic way. This is a problem for the basic researcher
trying to discern general laws or theories, and it is a problem for
the practitioner who needs to help the individual (Morgan and
Morgan, 2001). As Skinner quipped, “No one goes to the circus
to see the average dog jump through a hoop significantly oftener
than untrained dogs” (Skinner, 1956, p. 228).
More recently, Barlow and Nock (2009) asserted, “whether it’s
a laboratory rat or a patient in the clinic with a psychological
disorder, it is the individual organism that is the principle unit of
analysis in the science of psychology” (p. 19). Individuals behave,
not averages. People don’t respond “on average,” they respond
a certain way at a certain time. This is no matter of opinion, it
has to be true. The average is a statistical construct, derived from
two or more performances, not a feature of the natural world
(Sidman, 1952, 1960). Further, the statistical relation between
some value of the independent variable and an average value
of the dependent variable is not a real relation. The problem is
made worse when the independent variable varies from case to
case, as, for example, with psychotherapy procedures. You then
are dealing with a statistical relation between an average value
of an independent variable and an average value of a dependent
variable. Relying on averaged performances also means that you
have no effect without the data from all of your subjects because
the effect never occurred independent of the statistical analysis.
Returning to Figure 1, note that the two subjects performed
differently over time. As such, it is not simply a matter of
collecting samples of performance frommany different people to
smooth the rough edges. You can average the two performances,
but the result will not accurately describe either. Repeating this
many times across many subjects does not improve the situation.
It also does no good to average the performance of an
individual, as doing so obscures the variability evident in the
individual performance. Averaging either subject’s data from
Figure 1 would obscure important features of those data. In
one case, it would obscure a cyclical pattern of performance.
In the other case, it would obscure an increasing trend across
time. Variability is something to be understood, not ignored.
To average it away is to assume that it is unimportant because
it does not represent the real world. But variability does not
obscure the real world, it is the real world. There is an important
difference between controlling variability and “controlling for”
variability. Controlling variability is a matter of experimental
technique, whereas controlling for variability is a matter of
statistical inference. Contrary to the way they are typically used,
averages are most appropriate when the data in question are
fairly stable. To quote Claude Bernard, the father of modern
experimental medicine:
[W]e must never make average descriptions of experiments,
because the true relations of phenomena disappear in the average;
when dealing with complex and variable experiments, we must
study their various circumstances...averages must therefore be
rejected, because they confuse, while aiming to unify, and distort
while aiming to simplify. Averages are applicable only to reducing
very slightly varying numerical data about clearly defined and
absolutely simple cases (Bernard, 1865/1957, p. 135).
In single-case experiments, the focus is on repeated measures
of individual performance, not the average performance,
with experimental control demonstrated subject-by-subject. If
performances are stable and similar, then averaging the data
can be a useful way to summarize the results. If not, averaging
performances will obscure relevant functional relations or
suggest functional relations where none exist.
REPLICATION AND GENERALITY
Replication is the focal issue of psychology’s current public
relations crisis (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), as between-
subjects experiments that rely on null-hypothesis testing and
statistical significance can only be interpreted in the context of
multiple replications. Knowing that a single study of 500 people
produced an experimental effect that was significant at the 0.05
level tells us relatively little about the likelihood that the effect
was real. Unfortunately, many people believe that a p-value of
0.05 means either that there is only a 0.05 chance that there was
no experimental effect, or that there is only a 0.95 chance that the
results are replicable. Neither interpretation is correct.
A significance level of 0.05 means that you would expect to
get the dataset in question 5 out of every 100 times if the null
hypothesis is true. With a single study, it is quite possible that you
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produced one of those five datasets. The only way to reject a null
hypothesis is to conduct multiple similar studies that produce
similar results. Moreover, to reject a null hypothesis based on a
low p-value requires reversing the direction of the conditional
probability, which is a mathematical error (Branch, 2009). For
example, if the probability of it being cloudy given that it is
raining is 0.95, this does not mean that the probability of it
raining given that it is cloudy is 0.05. A null hypothesis cannot be
rejected on the basis of a single study, no matter the widely-held
beliefs to the contrary.
Single-case research designs involve replication of the
experimental effect within the experiment, either within the
individual subjects or across the subjects in the same experiment.
The degree of internal validity possible with single-case research
provides the foundation for replications across subjects and
settings. Replication is possible when the relevant variables are
identified—similar effects will be produced under circumstances
in which those variables are present. Repeated performances on
some experimental task are measured during baseline periods
when the independent variable is not present and compared
to repeated measures of the same performance when the
independent variable is present. Each time behavior changes
systematically when the condition changes, the experimental
effect is replicated. The more replications, the more convincing
the demonstration of experimental control1.
Despite the advantages in terms of internal validity, some
assume that findings from single-case designs have limited
external validity because data obtained from a few subjects might
not generalize to a population at large. Actually, single-case
research is precisely the way to establish generality, because
to do so one first has to identify the relevant controlling
variables for the phenomenon under study (Sidman, 1960).
Generality is best established inductively, moving from the single
case to ever-larger collections of single cases experiments with
high internal validity. To have external validity you must first
have internal validity (Guala, 2003; Hogarth, 2005). Without a
complete understanding of the relevant variables, it is difficult to
1A number of other single-case designs have been developed to address different
experimental manipulations and different dependent variables, and there are many
comprehensive reviews of single-case experimental designs available (e.g., Barlow
et al., 2008; Johnston and Pennypacker, 2009; Kazdin, 2010).
specify the circumstances in which you are likely to produce
a given effect. Thorngate (1986) put it this way: “To find out
what people do in general, we must first discover what each
person does in particular, then determine what, if anything, these
particulars have in common...” (p. 75).
Between-subjects designs are sometimes appropriate for what
might be referred to as “engineering problems” (Sidman, 1960).
For example, determining the effect a psychological intervention
is likely to have in a large-scale delivery under naturalistic
conditions. However, this is an endpoint along the research
continuum. The path running from the establishment of internal
validity to the demonstration of external validity is long and
sometimes winding, but that is how science progresses. Leaping
ahead means you miss some important landmarks along the way.
CONCLUSION
Single-case research designs enjoy both history and currency in
the natural sciences. In psychology, such designs have a storied
history (Boring, 1929) but are currently out of favor (Morgan
and Morgan, 2001; Barlow et al., 2008; Barlow and Nock,
2009). This is not necessarily for the better. Although between-
subjects experiments certainly have their place, psychology would
benefit if more researchers studied fewer subjects, took repeated
measures of the subjects they study, and established generality
inductively and systematically across individual subjects before
turning to between-subjects research. All of these are reasons for
emphasizing single-case research, and psychology will advance
quicker and farther as a natural science and produce more
effective technologies if it does. Size does matter. Sometimes, less
is more, and we can learn more by studying fewer people.
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